Does God Exist?

(The following is a modified version of an essay I wrote for one of my philosophy classes a long time ago. Please excuse its sophomoric nature. The purpose of this post is to merely express my current beliefs, sophistication and extent of knowledge. I hope this will be a reference point from which I will be able to monitor how much I change or improve in the future.)

Does God Exist?

Cultures across the world have traditionally converged on the matter of a belief in the existence of God(s). The Gods had different names and characteristics; some believed in monotheism (such as Abrahamism) and others in polytheism (Greco-Roman religions) and furthermore, some conceptions even include a supernatural realm without an entity (Buddhism); but it seemed as though the ancients universally treated the supernatural as a required part of reality; perhaps in order to explain what they were incapable of explaining. Moreover, great theologians and philosophers over the past centuries have tried to place the belief in God on a platform of reason. With the likes of scholars such as Thomas Aquinas,  one of the most important questions they tried to answer is regarding the existence of God. The question of God’s existence is a question about reality that everyone ought to ponder over. Does God exist? Do we have any reasons to believe a God exists? Many philosophers say yes. Many arguments have been proposed in favor of God’s existence. A classical argument for God’s existence is the argument from design which states that God’s existence is inferred from the complexities of nature. A different argument that has earned both marvel and notoriety is the ontological argument  which concludes that existence is in the very nature or definition of God. Another popular argument is the first cause argument which states that there must have been a first cause and this cause is God. This argument has received some recent attention in its reformed version known as the Kalam cosmological argument which infers God’s existence with the help of philosophical as well as modern scientific data regarding the origins of the Universe. However, the soundness of these arguments are often questioned and debated and upon analyzing the many arguments about God, it seems that disbelieving in the existence of God is the most reasonable position to hold.

            It is important to understand that disbelieving in the existence of God is different from asserting that God does not exist. This idea can be easily explained via an analogy. Imagine yourself being approached by a stranger who claims that what everyone perceives as reality is merely a computer simulation called the ‘Matrix’. He then begins to give you a few reasons as to why he believes the perceived reality is not real. However, you are not convinced by his reasons. You are able to cast doubt and question all the arguments he produced. However, at the end of the day, you are also unable to prove that reality is not merely the Matrix. It almost seems as though it would be impossible to prove that the Matrix does not exist. However, you realize that even though you cannot disprove the existence of the Matrix, you find no reason to believe it actually exists. Therefore, the most reasonable position would be to disbelieve in the existence of the Matrix. Likewise, if one is not convinced by the reasons given for the existence of God, then the most reasonable and intellectually honest position to hold would be to disbelieve in the existence of God.

            Thus, we carefully examine three of the most popular arguments for God and they are the argument from design, the ontological argument and the kalam cosmological argument for God’s existence. Before examining these arguments, it is important to define God. For the purpose of the essay, the traditional Western conception of God is considered. The commonly accepted definition is that God  is the greatest conceivable being i.e. God is omnipotent, omnibenevolent, omniscient, immaterial, eternal and the un-caused creator of the universe. Let us now begin examining the arguments for God starting with the argument from design.

 The Design Argument
 Premise 1) Artifacts that exhibit complexity are designed with intelligence.

Premise 2) The universe exhibits complexity.

Conclusion) Therefore, the Universe is designed with intelligence.

            From this argument, a second argument is produced in the following manner, 

Premise 1) The Universe is intelligently designed.

Premise 2) If the Universe is intelligently designed, then the universe was designed by God

Conclusion) Therefore, the Universe was designed by God

            The important point to note is that that the first argument is formally invalid. Notice that the first premise does  not state that 'everything that exhibits complexity are designed with intelligence'. Rather, the first premise discusses the fact that all intelligently designed or man-made artifacts are designed with intelligence. The fact that all man-made artifacts exhibit some level of complexity due to intelligent design does not logically necessitate that all non man-made objects exhibiting complexity are the result of intelligent design. In other words, the first premise fails to establish the implied but necessary notion that "Everything exhibiting complexity is designed with intelligence." A prominent example can be seen in the case of evolution via natural selection where a combination of natural factors ranging from random mutations, resources, predator-prey relationships, external environmental changes, adaptability etc are sufficient to create complex biological systems. The example from biological evolution invalidates the necessity for intelligence to produce complexity.

            Another point to note is that the first argument is one based on analogy to Human artifacts. The classic example is that of William Paley’s watch-maker analogy. The idea is that if a watch implies the existence of a watchmaker (even if one has no experience of who the watchmaker is), then the universe implies the existence of a creator of the universe (even if one cannot directly experience the creator or the creation).

            The second argument follows the first argument in stating that God is the intelligent designer of the universe. In examining the argument, the first obvious doubt would be regarding the strength of the analogy provided. Using Paley’s watchmaker example, should it necessarily be the case that the existence of a universe implies a Creator of the universe that same way a watch implies a watch maker? Perhaps we should examine why a watch implies a watchmaker and analyze if the universe or nature fits the same category as a watch. The main point to note is that the statement "a watch implies a watchmaker" is a posteriori knowledge that is one based on sensory experience (either of the person or through another person). Yet the analogy treats the statement as a priori knowledge even when such a claim is unjustified.  Another point to note about the watch is that one can physically experience a watchmaker making a watch. Anyone is capable of walking into a factory and see a watch getting made. The same is not true of, for example, mountains. Science would tell us about the natural formation of mountains due to geological activity. However, following Paley’s analogy, should it be the case that mountains were individually designed the same way every watch was designed? In this case, the God explanation seems to be redundant as it is parsimonious and sufficient to accept the reason for the formation of mountains was due to the activity of plate tectonics alone. Similarly, just as mountains do not necessarily need a mountain-maker, why couldn't it be the case that a universe does not necessarily need a universe-creator?

            The third point to note about the watch-maker analogy is that the extent of the analogy is arbitrary. The analogy states that a watch implies a watchmaker. But why stop the analogy there? Why not the following? A watch implies a watchmaker which further implies that the watchmaker had a material (human) cause. This would be against the definition of a God who is defined as immaterial and uncaused.

            A response to the third point would be that one can easily imagine different kinds of designers (for example, alien intelligence) that could be fundamentally different from humans. Thus it can be argued that the watchmaker does not further imply that, for example, the designer was human etc. It can be then be stated that what all designers would have in common is a mind. Thus, the proponents of the design argument can argue that the watchmaker further implies only an immaterial mind which would indeed solidify the God explanation. However, this theistic contention suffers from a major flaw in that it is based on the presupposition of dualism which states that the mind and a material body are distinct entities. Many advances in the field of neuroscience seem to indicate that the mind could be a product of the brain and not something distinct from a physical body. At the very least, an atheist can demand evidence for the existence of a mind independent of a material body. Thus we are again left with the initial criticism of the argument from design i.e that a watchmaker implies a material agent as a cause and by this analogy, it would then follow that a material agent created the universe. However, God is defined as immaterial and if an immaterial God did not create the universe then God as the creator of the universe does not exist, then by definition God does not exist.

The Ontological Argument

            Having cast our doubts on the argument from design let us now move on to the Ontological argument for God’s existence. The ontological argument is perhaps the cleverest of all arguments ever made for God. The argument intends to answer one of the most complex questions regarding reality yet it remains deceptively simple. Bertrand Russell, the famous atheist philosopher, states that “it is easier to feel convinced that [the ontological argument] must be fallacious than it is to find out precisely where the fallacy lies.” The ontological argument appears in various forms. We will discuss two versions of this argument. The first version attempts to establish the existence of God through the very definition of God. The argument is as follows,

1. If God does not exist, then God is not a perfect being.
2. God is a perfect being
3. Therefore God exists.

             This version of the ontological argument is formally valid and it relies on the concept of a perfect being which is called God. The reasoning is that a perfect being is not perfect if it does not exist but since a perfect being is perfect by definition, then the perfect being has to exist. This existing perfect being is called God.

            Two objections can be raised against this argument. Firstly, premise 1 can be doubted by arguing that perfection does not necessitate existence. For example, consider the concept of a perfect place where all humans are happy. If existence is necessitated by perfection, then it would follow that such a perfect place where all humans are happy exists. Yet quite clearly, not all humans live on this perfect place (unless Earth is this perfect place) nor is it the case that all humans are happy (i.e. if Earth is the perfect place). Thus, it would follow via reductio ad absurdum that such a perfect place does not exist and furthermore it would follow that perfection does not entail existence. Moreover, such a line of reasoning can be used to state that many other imaginary places and characters are real. Thus, it can be argued existence is separate from the attribute of a subject. Therefore, a critic may conclude that a perfect god only exists if he exists just as a perfect place exists only if it exists.

            Secondly, one may accuse the argument of circular reasoning. A circular argument is one in which the conclusion appears as one of the premises and a "clever" circular argument is one in which the conclusion appears "hidden" in the premises. If god is defined as being perfect and perfection entails existence as one of its properties then, essentially god is defined as existing. Therefore, in simplistic terms, argument can be restated as “God exists because he is an existing being.” Thus one may argue that it commits the fallacy of question begging.

            That being the case, the ontological argument from God’s definition is not very popular. The more commonly used form of the ontological argument is as follows;

1. It is greater to exist in the mind and reality, than mind alone.
2. The greatest conceivable being exists in the mind and in reality.
3. Therefore, the greatest conceivable being exists in reality.

         Once again, this version of the ontological argument is formally valid. If it is the case that existing in 'mind and reality' is greater than existing in the 'mind' alone then a being with the greatest conceivable attributes would have to exist in 'reality' because if such a being only existed in the 'mind' then one could conceive of a greater being i.e. one that exists in both 'mind and reality' and this would then be the greatest conceivable being. 

            The obvious objection to this version of the ontological argument is to question the first premise. Why should existing in 'reality and mind' be greater than 'mind' alone? The force of the argument is that an "existing being" is greater than a "non-existing being". One may ask why existence should be a greatness at all?  The above discussion raises the following question; why is 'existence' being treated as if it were a property? Immanuel Kant, a German theistic philosopher, famously concluded that existence is not a property. This is to say that "existence" is not a part of any objects nature but rather it is a "state" independent of the nature of any object. Initially, a theist can answer such questions by listing the utility of existent beings. For example, consider Alexander Fleming, the discoverer of the antibiotic penicillin which proved to be one of the greatest advances in the history of medicine. For the sake of simplicity, assume that there were 3 factors that led Dr. Fleming to his discovery and let these factors be brilliance, knowledge and dedication. Now for a thought experiment, suppose that Alexander Fleming never existed in "reality"; then imagine a person named Fake Fleming with the same amount of brilliance, knowledge and dedication who, in your imagination, discovers penicillin and contributes to the world of medicine exactly as the actual Dr. Fleming did except for the fact this person only "exists" in one's mind. What is the difference between Alexander Fleming in the actual world and Fake Fleming in a possible world. The difference is that Fake Fleming, despite discovering penicillin and benefiting society in one's imagination, did not actually help anyone in "reality".  In this sense, Alexander Fleming was definitely "greater" than Fake Fleming.

        The mistake with such an objection here is that "utilitarian greatness" is conflated with "characteristic greatness". The "greatness" in the context of a scientist finding a cure is the result of benefiting the society. It was not, however, a characteristic "greatness" of the scientist. In relation to example above, Fake Fleming is supposed to have been imagined with all the characteristics of Alexander Fleming which entails that Fake Fleming is intrinsically as great as Alexander Fleming. One can further extend this scenario by stating the same amount of benefit that was reaped from Alexander Fleming's work in the actual world was also achieved in Fake Fleming's hypothetical world. With such an understanding, it become clear why we in the actual world would intuitively rank Alexander Fleming as greater. This is simply due to the case that utilitarian greatness is only measured in terms of what benefits existing beings i.e. 'us' who live in the actual world. There was however, no difference to be spotted in the characteristics of Alexander Fleming and Fake Fleming. As the above mentioned Kant famously stated, the 'thought of a stack of 100 coins' and the 'thought of an existing stack of 100 coins' are no different. Adding "existence" to the 'thought of a stack of coins' does not change its value.
           Furthermore, it seems nonsensical to state anything at all, let alone God, "exists" in the 'mind' in the same manner anything exists in the actual world. When one thinks of a stack of coins, it is not the case that a stack of coins actually "exists" anywhere in the "mind". Rather, it is the case there is merely a thought of a stack of coins.  Therefore, the argument fallaciously equivocates the word "exists" since they have different meanings when used in relation to the mind or reality. Thus, the first premise bases itself on a faulty comparison. 

   
 The Kalam Cosmological Argument
           The Kalam cosmological argument (henceforth KCA). The recently popularized version of this argument was given by a popular contemporary philosopher named William Lane Craig. Dr. Craig’s version is as follows;

Premise 1) Anything that begins to exist has a cause.

Premise 2) The universe began to exist.

Conclusion) Therefore, the Universe has a cause.

            Dr. Craig has provided sophisticated and well researched evidences from modern cosmology to substantiate the KCA. In order to perform true justice to Craig’s argument, one would need to examine all of his points and research in detail. However, such an examination is beyond the scope of this essay. Thus, we will only superficially examine the truth value of the premises of Craig's KCA.

            The first premise states that “anything that begins to exist has a cause.” Even though this premise seems initially plausible, the meaning of the premise might not be as clear as it seems. For instance, what exactly does it mean to say “an object begins to exist”. The meaning given by Craig is that it means an initially non-existent object has started to exist. Let us consider the example of a wooden table. A table “beginning to exist” means that the table was once non-existent until it was made by a carpenter. Here the carpenter is the cause of the table. In the same line of reasoning, the KCA would say that God is the cause of the universe.

            The second premise is more sophisticated than the first one as it involves evidences and data from contemporary cosmology that are fairly difficult for a layman to comprehend. Nevertheless, here is the general idea that can be garnered about what modern cosmology states about premise 2. The universe began about 13.7 billion years ago by the expansion of space and time from what is called a point of singularity. This event of initial expansion is called the ‘Big Bang’. KCA tries to imply that God is the cause of the Big Bang. Craig’s reasoning for positing God as the cause of the universe is as follows; since the universe was brought into existence from non-existence, then whatever caused the universe (all of matter, space and time) to exist must be outside of space and time i.e it should be immaterial (since matter needs space). Only abstract numbers and minds are immaterial. Numbers cannot consciously create anything therefore the cause of the universe must be a conscious immaterial mind. This mind is then defined as God or the mind of God.

            While examining the soundness of these claims, we realize that KCA faces some of the same objections faced by the argument from design. Unlike the argument from design which was based on an analogy, the first premise of KCA is an inductively strong statement. We all know inductively that any time a new object is made such as a watch or a car or a book, it was caused to exist by an external agent. However, is this enough to conclude that universe was created by an agent external to the universe? Let us go back to the table analogy. Should it necessarily be the case that a God is the cause of the universe the same way a carpenter is the cause of a table? Let us now examine the strength of this analogy. What does the sentence, “A carpenter caused a table to exist” mean? It does not mean that a carpenter was able to create a table out of nothing. He needed other raw materials such as wood and nails. The carpenter has merely arranged the wood and other existing materials in a specific shape. We call anything of that shape, a table. This can be extended to other man-made objects as well. Thus we can generalize inductively that human creators cannot create anything out of nothing but he or she can only arrange ‘pre-existing’ matter into different forms. If this is the case, then what does it mean to say that “God caused the universe to exist”? Relying on inductive experience, it would then mean God could not cause the universe to exist from nothing but God had to arrange pre-existing matter in the form of the universe.

            However, if the universe was formed from pre-existing matter that existed outside of time (even though, it is not clear how this can be), then the God explanation once again becomes redundant as it would be more parsimonious to assume the universe exists due to some natural phenomenon acting on the uncaused pre-existing matter. This can be written in the form of an argument called the Kalam cosmological argument for God’s non-existence and it is as follows,

Premise 1) Anything that begins to exist was created from pre-existing material
Premise 2) Universe began to exist.
Premise 3) Universe was created from pre-existing material

Premise 4) If God created the universe, then the universe was not created from pre-existing material

Conclusion) Therefore, God did not create the universe

            The obvious theistic objection would be regarding the first premise. They may point out that since God is omnipotent, God can create something out of nothing. However, this objection faces two criticisms. Firstly, one can make the accusation of special pleading; and if special pleading is valid in this case, then the same can also be employed by atheists with regard to KCA. An atheist could special plead that everything except that universe needs a cause and thereby rejecting the first premise of KCA. Secondly, it is to be noted that the first premise of the new argument shares the same inductive strength as that of the first premise of KCA. The first premise of KCA is inductively strong because we do not have experience of anything beginning to exist uncaused. Likewise, the first premise of the new argument shares equal inductive strength because we do not have experience of anything beginning to exist from nothing (i.e without pre-existing material). Thus this argument is as strong as KCA. Moreover, recent ideas in cosmology such as the Multiverse theory would perhaps be compatible with the idea that matter has always existed and that our universe is one of many universes generated in the multiverse.

            The next problem for KCA comes from the idea that the cause of the universe must be immaterial and only a mind is capable of doing so. Once again, this presupposes dualism which we have already cast our doubt on while examining the Argument from design. Once again, an atheist could demand the theist to demonstrate that a mind can exist independent of a material body. If it is not possible for an immaterial mind to exist then God could not have created the universe which entails that God does not exist since there is no creator for the universe.

            In conclusion, we can see that three of the most popular arguments for the existence of God can be questioned and doubted. The argument from design is based on an analogy about the complexities of human artifacts. Yet it is not very clear that this inference can be extended to the universe on the larger scale. The ontological argument, which implies that "existence" is a property of God, is a deviously clever argument, however, it is the subject of various objections that weaken its claim to soundness. Most of all, there is not  enough good reason to accept that "existence" is a property, let alone a greatness-enhancing property. The Kalam cosmological argument was based on the intuitive idea that everything needs a cause for its existence. However, it is once again not clear why this cause must be god or if it is even possible for God to be the cause. Other arguments for God can be subjected to similar form of skepticism. Since, convincing reasons for God’s existence have not been produced; the most reasonable and intellectually honest position to hold is the position of disbelief in God.

Qur'an's Error: Sura 4:82 "If [Quran] had been from other than Allah, they would have found within it much contradiction"

Sura 4:82 would be found in the average Islamophile's list of favorite verses. It is often quoted in the form of a challenge to Rationalists and others. Sura 4:82 states the following; (http://quran.com/4/82)

Sahih International

If it had been from [any] other than Allah , they would have found within it much contradiction.

Muhsin Khan

Had it been from other than Allah, they would surely have found therein much contradictions.

Pickthall

If it had been from other than Allah they would have found therein much incongruity.

Yusuf Ali

Had it been from other Than Allah, they would surely have found therein Much discrepancy.

Shakir

And if it were from any other than Allah, they would have found in it many a discrepancy.

Dr. Ghali

And if it had been from (any where) other than the Providence of Allah, indeed they would have found in it many difference (s).

Utilizing this verse, the Muslim apologist will demand reasonable individuals to show an error in the Qur'an. They will also state with exuding confidence that no one in 14 centuries have been able to show an error in the Quran.

Such a conversation usually unfolds in 2 ways; i) the Rationalist ignores the apologist or ii) the Rationalist shows some of the errors in the Quran (creation from blood clots, setting of sun in a muddy spring, seminal fluid from the back, flat earth, denial of human evolution etc).

Whenever ii) occurs, the apologist will usually dismiss any evidence and can be seen asserting his literary liberty to interpret the sentences however he wishes to. Given the spectacular vagueness of much of the Qur'anic statements, the conversation almost always reaches an impasse with each side rejecting the other's interpretation (and perhaps moving on to a round of creative insults).

However it seems to be the case that neither the apologist nor the Rationalist has reflected carefully on the challenge itself. The great irony of the Qur'an is that the very verse that issues this challenge also meets the challenge i.e. Sura 4:82 is an error on it own since it constructs a false conditional statement.

The verse states that if the Qur'an was from a source other than Allah, then it would contain many errors or contradictions.
Now consider this question, is it possible for a man-made work to contain no errors or contradictions? This should be uncontroversial. There are countless human texts that would be free of any errors.
Then, if it is the case that it is possible for man-made works to be free of any errors, then it is also possible for the Qur'an to contain no errors and be man-made i.e. be from a source other than Allah.
Given the above possibility, Sura 4:82 constructs a false conditional for it is easily possible for the Qur'an to be "from other than Allah" and yet contain no errors.
Thus, Sura 4:82 is an erroneous statement.
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The concept is fairly simple. For a detailed explanation, continue along. The following proof will use terms used in the discipline of Logic.

In Logic, certain statements are called "conditional statements" when it consists of a relationship between 2 (or more) atomic statements where one is the antecedent and the other is the consequent. These are usually denoted as "If ... then" statements. For example;

"If John is a human, then John is a mammal"

The antecedent in this case is "John is a human" and the consequent is "John is a mammal". In logic, this statement is equivalent to it's "contrapositive statement" which in the above case would say;

"If John is not a mammal, then John is not a human"

In Formal Logic, any conditional statement can be symbolized in the following manner;

"P --> Q"
=(this is equivalent to its contrapositive)=
 "~Q --> ~P"

P symbolizes the antecedent; Q symbolizes the consequent; '~' symbolizes negation (i.e ~P means "not P" or "P is false"); '-->' symbolizes the conditional relationship (i.e. "~Q --> ~P" means "IF not Q THEN not P)

A fair knowledge of these simple concepts alone are sufficient to examine the Qur'anic statement in Sura 4:82. Consider the verse,

"If [Qur'an] had been from other than Allah, they would have found within it much contradiction"

The verse expresses a conditional relationship between two atomic statements. The antecedent is the atomic statement "The Qur'an is not from Allah". The consequent is the atomic statement "Errors will be found in the Quran" (Verse rephrased for simplicity). Thus the verse is stating the following relationship;

"If the Qur'an is not from Allah, then errors will be found in the Quran"

Let A = "The Qur'an is from Allah". Thus ~A = "The Qur'an is not from Allah" (which is the antecedent above).
Let E = "Errors will be found in the Quran" (which is the consequent).
The above statement can be symbolized as

"~A --> E"

As stated above, this statement is logically equivalent to it's contrapositive statement which would state the following;

"~E --> ~(~A)"

==

"~E --> A"

==

"If no errors are found in the Qur'an, then the Qur'an is from Allah"

For those who were unable to spot the mistake in the original verse, its contrapositive statement should certainly render the issue clearer. A conditional statement is false if it is possible for the antecedent to be true and the consequent still false. Such is the case for this verse.

Take the original verse for example, it is possible for the antecedent to be true and yet for the consequent to be false i.e. for the Qur'an to be not from Allah, and at the same time be free of errors. Likewise, for the contrapositive statement, it is possible for there to be no errors in the Qur'an and yet at the same time, not be a product of divine intelligence.

It would clearly be absurd to state that any piece of text that does not contain errors is from Allah and yet this is what the Qur'an claims by logical extension. Certainly, for the Muslim apologist (especially ones acquainted with the principles of Propositional Logic), this is an irrefutable error in their Holy Book. Their only option to rescue the Qur'an is to show that it is impossible for the Qur'an to not be from Allah if it had no errors in it. Of course, this is not at all a tenable position as Humans have produced countless texts with no errors in it.

Thus, offering one of the greatest unintentional ironies, the very verse that challenges one to show errors in the Qur'an is on its own an irrefutable error.
_________________________________________________________________________________

There seems to have been a debate about this issue on youtube between a Skeptic and a Muslim apologist. The apologist, apparently did the unthinkable, by stating that any book that does not contain errors are from a divine source. For such unfortunate souls, the skeptic, who goes by thinker1, has created (sorry, it was revealed to him) a book that is i) free of errors and ii) claims to be from God. Here you go,

http://infaliblebookfromgod.blogspot.com/
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Possible Objections from Muslims

1) The verse actually means "Since Qur'an is from Allah, no errors will be found in the Quran."

Reply: Even if this is what the Qur'an meant by the verse, it has no bearing on the argument above. The argument above is based on the structure of the statement in the Qur'an. It is the structure that is at fault. For example, consider the verse again

"If the Qur'an is not from Allah, then errors will be found in the Quran"

Let A = "The Qur'an is from Allah". Thus ~A = "The Qur'an is not from Allah" (which is the antecedent above). Let E = "Errors will be found in the Quran" (which is the consequent). The above statement can be symbolized as

"~A --> E"

If instead, the Qur'an were to say "If the Qur'an is from Allah, then no Errors will be found in the Quran" (i.e. "A --> ~E), then the conditional relationship would be correct. However, as it is currently found in the Qur'an, the conditional relationship is false.

2) The verse is an example of Abductive Reasoning

Reply: First and foremost, it should be noted that Abductive logic does not absolve the false relationship constructed in a conditional statement. Thus, this is an absurd and misinformed use of the term "Abductive Rasoning". 

A false conditional is a false statement i.e. it is an error in the truth of the statement. This is not an error in deductive logic for it to be reconciled with inductive or abductive reasoning. To state so, is to show an utter misunderstanding of the argument presented in this blogpost as well as ignorance of Formal Logic.

Secondly, abductive reasoning could only have been utilized if the conditional statement had been in the form of a true conditional, as found in objection 1,  i.e. "If the Qur'an is from Allah, then no Errors will be found in the Quran". However, this would still be a very weak case of abductive reasoning.

Abductive Reasoning can be defined in the following way; it is a form of reasoning that allows one to reasonably hypothesize an inconclusive statement from a known event. For example, consider the following conditional

(1) "If there is fire, then there is smoke"

In formal logic, based on the above conditional, it is fallacious to conclude there is fire if there is smoke (Since that is not what the conditional states; this commits the fallacy called Affirming the Consequent). However, if one were to see smoke, it is certainly reasonable for one to assume or hypothesize that there is fire (even if the fire is not visible). Such a form of reasoning is called Abduction (as opposed to deduction or induction).

On the other hand, consider this conditional statement;

(2) "If it is night, then John is asleep"

Unlike example (1), it is not as reasonable to assume that it is night just because John is asleep as he could be sleeping during daytime in this particular instance. This would constitute a weak case of abductive reasoning.

However, consider a conditional such as this,

(3) "If Obama is living in Mars, then Obama is breathing"

Based on this conditional, it would in fact be unreasonable to abduce from the fact that Obama is breathing, that he is living in Mars. However, note that the conditional is a true statement i.e. if Obama were to be alive on Mars, he would have to be breathing. Yet it would be unreasonable to state that he is on Mars merely because he is breathing. This would constitute an absurd case of abductive reasoning. 

Likewise, even if the Qur'an contained no errors, it would not be reasonable to state that the Quran is from Allah. To establish such a form of reasoning, the Muslim would have to take on the absurd task of showing that any text that is free of errors are from Allah. Of course, this is false as countless human works contain no errors or contradictions etc.

In conclusion, by constructing a false conditional statement in Sura 4:82, the Qur'an has committed an irrefutable error. The irony of the fact that this erroneous Qur'anic verse challenges skeptics to show a Qur'nic error is, almost divinely, priceless.

Copout #2 to Embryology in the Quran: Much Ado about Nothing

For a longer list of objections and replies to Embryology in the Quran: Much Ado about Nothing, see the following page, http://embryologyinthequran.blogspot.com/p/objections-and-replies.html

2. Copout: The arguments made by CaptainDisguise "rely" on mockery and insults.

Reply: There seems to be an outcry among certain individuals including Hamza Tzortzis regarding the style of presentation of the paper, Embryology in the Quran: Much Ado about Nothing, which apparently and allegedly "relies" on mockery and insults. This of course is not true.

While such knee-jerk ad hominem attacks and 'copouts' were expected by the authors and contributors behind the paper, it nevertheless needs pointing out that the above objection is factually incorrect.

While it is the case that the presentation of an argument, however tasteless it is, does not invalidate the argument presented; it is still not true that any of the arguments presented in the paper or the responses to objections posted on the blog "rely" on "mockery and insults".

The paper as well as the replies to the objections on the blog have been written and presented in a very tasteful manner without resorting to mockery or insults as well as preserving objectivity as best as possible.

As such, a distinction should necessarily be made between the presentation of the paper from the personal blogs or sites of the authors behind the paper. 

For example, the youtube channel "Captaindisguise", which is run by one of the authors of the paper, is  considered as a place where the author engages freely with others and without adorning any aura of an artificial academic air. The author may or may not resort to 'mockery and insults" in such places. 

None of the authors, contributors or supporters believe that the personal styles reflected in their corresponding blogs or channels have any relevance to the objectivity and professionalism that has been maintained in the presentation of Embryology in the Quran: Much Ado about Nothing.

However, it is still not clear what specifically was said by the authors of the paper to be accused of relying on "mockery and insults". A reasonable guess is that Hamza et al. are referring to the fact that the authors have demonstrated that Hamza Tzortzis has been dishonest, inconsistent and often deficient in his work. If this is the instance that has warranted the accusation of 'reliance on mockery and insults', then the authors disagree that this constitutes as "mockery and insults" and no apologies are made for stating blatant truths. 

Therefore, such baseless accusation can only be considered as yet another attempt to "convince the mind to circumvent the facts obstructing the path to their deeply held absurdities."

Those with a sounder mind are encouraged to read  the paper as well as the responses to raised objections before making premature judgements. An intense effort will be made to address all contentions, valid or otherwise, and will be presented in an organized manner on the blog

Objection 3 to Embryology in the Quran: Much Ado about Nothing

For a longer list of objections and replies to Embryology in the Quran: Much Ado about Nothing, see the following page, http://embryologyinthequran.blogspot.com/p/objections-and-replies.html

3. Objection:"Nutfah" does mean "a singular entity from a bigger group of it kind" because Lisan al-Arab says “الواحدة من كل ذلك نَطَفة ونُطَفة” (The singular of all that is natafah and nutafah). (Other similar arguments also addressed).

Reply: Hamza Tzortzis in his original version of his paper had stated that the classical Arabic lexicon named Lisan al-Arab defined a word used in the Qur'an called “nutfah” as “a singular entity from a bigger group of its kind”.[i] This was subsequently found to be baseless which forced Hamza to say that the above definition is only “suggested” by the actual words in Lisan al-Arab, which are “a small amount of water.”[ii] The dishonesty involved in the argument has been documented in detail in the paper Embryology in the Qur'an: Much Ado about Nothing.[iii]

While this may be irrelevant it is worth pointing to the fact that this definition of “a singular entity from a bigger group of its kind” does not originate in any credible source but it comes from an apologetic website[iv] owned by a very unintelligent man.[v]

Nevertheless, despite the fact that such a definition does not exist in Lisan al-Arab and despite the fact that Lisan al-Arab specifically defines “nutfah” as “a small amount of water”, “the fluid of the man” and “semen due to it’s small amount”,ⁱⁱⁱ many individuals and followers of Hamza Tzortzis have been making attempts to salvage Hamza’s credibility by imposing the very convenient definition into whatever pinhole forced into Lisan al-Arab.

The attempts to stuff the elephant of a definition of “a singular entity from a bigger group of its kind” into the needle-eyes of Lisan al-Arab seems to be in the following 2 ways;

1) Certain phrases in Lisan al-Arab suggest the definition of “a singular entity” therefore “nutfah” means “a singular entity from a bigger group of its kind.”

2) “Nutfah” is a singular term. Many singular “nutfah” can add up to become a bigger group of “nutfah” (or “nutaf (.pl)). Therefore, “nutfah” is a “singular entity from a bigger group of its kind”.

Before analyzing the above contentions, a more important factor needs to be addressed. There seems to be a particular misunderstanding among the critics of the paper who are trying to situate the definition of “a singular entity from a bigger group of its kind” into the classical lexicon. Perhaps this is a result of their ignorance of the English language as well a reluctance to consider the logical implications of their arguments.

The important point to note is that when Hamza used the definition of “a singular entity from a bigger group of its kind”; there is a very specific image that he wanted to portray; that of humans being’s created out of “a single sperm that fertilizes the egg which comes from a group of millions of sperm cells”. Even though, this very inference in itself is weak and unjustified, this is what is being attempted.

It is for that very reason that Hamza’s mistakes cannot be justified or given credence to by merely pointing out that whatever substance is signified by “nutfah” has the property of being part of a bigger group consisting of that substance. This would be arguing from an irrelevant tautology because any physical (or logically possible) object, substance etc can have the property of being part of a bigger group consisting of that object or substance.

For example, a single “God” can be a part of a bigger group consisting of many “Gods”. A single “car” can be part of a bigger group consisting of thousands of “cars”. A single “heap of sand” can be part of a bigger group consisting of a million “heaps of sand”. A single “group of people” can be part of a bigger group consisting of many “groups of people”. A single “amount of semen” can be part of a bigger group consisting of more “amounts of semen”. Thus, any physical or logically possible object, substance (including collective nouns such as heap, group, amount) has the property of potentially being a part of a bigger group. This is merely a general characteristic of any “thing”.[vi]

Therefore, presenting such a general property applicable to any object or substance and then attempting to conflate it with specific definition presented by Hamza Tzortzis is not only fallacious but also factually incorrect. Even if objects and substances like “God” or “car” can be described as “a singular entity from a bigger group of its kind”, the same is not true of collective nouns like heap, group or amount. For example “a heap of salt” is not equivalent to “a singular entity of salt”. Such an application is rendered even more meaningless when associated with words like “amount”. For example, “a small amount of water” is not only non-equivalent to “a singular entity of water” but also it is rather meaningless in terms of practical reality to even utter a phrase like “a singular entity of water”. Thus, the second contention listed above is baseless.

Tragically for the intellectual well-being of many Muslims, the above illogical reasoning is what has been presented in order to save Hamza’s credibility. The following is a more specific discussion of the type of bad argumentation that certain Muslims have been engaging in.

Some Muslim apologists assert that Hamza’s version of “a singular entity from a bigger group of its kind” is found in Lisan al-Arab even when Hamza himself admits that this is merely an inference (a bad one at that!ⁱⁱⁱ).

Two examples have been  provided by such apologists. The first example which has been quoted from Lisan al-Arab states the following;

 Interestingly, this specific example originates from the aforementioned apologetic website^iv run by a very unintelligent man.^v

Nevertheless, the most striking feature of this example from Lisan al-Arab is that it does not even refer to the same word used in the Qur'an. Qur'an uses “نُطْفَة” (nu-t-fah) while the entry above is describing the word “نُطَفَة” (nu-ta-fah).

Secondly, the above entry starts by saying the word “nataf” and “nutaf” (pl.) means “pearls” especially “small pearls” and also that it can mean “earrings”. Then the dictionary continues by stating that “the singular of all that is natafah and nutafah”

At first look, one is left in serious doubt as to how this entry has any relevance at all to a discussion about the Qur’an’s use of the word “nutfah” to mean “semen” or Hamza’s claim that “nutfah” means “a singular entity from a bigger group of it’s kind”.

Then in time when one spots what Muslim apologist’s claim is, one is left in serious doubt as to whether they are being serious. This is because the claim made here is that since the phrase, “الواحدة من كل ذلك نَطَفة ونُطَفة” (the singular of all that is Natafah and Nutafah) exists in Lisan al-Arab, “nutfah” can mean “a singular entity from a bigger group of its kind”.

The Muslim’s reasoning seems to be of the following, “the word ‘singular” and a word that sounds like “nutfah” exists in the same sentence. It is said that the “singular” is the word that sounds like “nutfah”. Therefore, “nutfah” means “a singular entity from a bigger group of its kind”.

Ignoring the fact that this is not even referring to the same word used in the Qur'an, it is appalling to witness arguments already addressed and refuted in the paper, Embryology in the Qur'an: Much Ado about Nothing, being repeated again and again. Hamza too made an attempt to validate his invented definition by pointing out that the grammatical number of the term “nutfah” is one i.e. it is singular and that it follows from the grammatical number of “nutfah” that it means “a singular entity from a bigger group of its kind”. Quite clearly, this is an invalid argument. The grammatical number of a word has no relevance as to the meaning of the word. For counterexamples, consider the words  “heap” and “amount”. They are both in the singular form yet it does not follow that “a heap of salt” is equivalent to “a grain of salt” or that “an amount of liquid” is equal to “a singular entity of liquid” (i.e. if such a phrase makes sense at all).

(NOTE: For the purpose of argumentation in the following discussion, the word “نُطَفَة” (nu-ta-fah) used above to mean “pearl” will be replaced with the word used in the Qur'an i.e. “نُطْفَة” (nu-t-fah))

The above contention raised by Muslims is the same as Hamza’s horrendous argument. It does not logically follow from the phrase “singular of all that (i.e nutaf) is nutfah” that “nutfah” means “a singular entity from a bigger group of its kind”. “Nutfah” meaning “a single pearl” does not entail that it cannot mean “a small amount of liquid”, “the fluid of man”, “semen due to its small amount” (all of which are the actual definition for “nutfah” in Lisan al-Arab). More importantly, “nutfah” signifying a “a single pearl” does not entail that it means “a singular entity from a bigger group of its kind” in the sense that Hamza has portrayed it.

For a more detailed counterexample, consider the word “mints” in English. In the 21^st century, the word “mints” can signify “plants of the genus Mentha” or “pieces of candy” etc. The singular of all that is “mint”. Interestingly, there is another meaning for the word “mint” that seems to have fallen out of use. In the middle ages however, the word “mint” was used to mean “a vast quantity or amount” especially in relation to money.[vii] The Oxford English Dictionary provides the following usage of the word from the 16^th century;

However, is there anyone who would argue that such an academically documented usage of the word is false? Would it be considered credible if a person said that the word “mint” cannot signify the meaning of “a vast amount” merely due to the fact that “mint” can also mean “a single piece of candy”?

Such an objection does not even seem warranted or relevant yet it is such weak and false ways of thinking that Muslims are forced to adopt in order ignore the clearly and academically documented usage of نُطْفَة” (nu-t-fah) to signify seminal fluid.

The second example provided by Muslim apologists[viii] is another entry from Lisan al-Arab which states the following,

“أَراد بالنطفتين بحر الروم وبحر الصين لأَن كل نطفة غير الأُخرى”

Transliteration: Arada bil-nutfatyn bahr ar-room wa bahr as-seen li’anna kul nutfah ghayr al-ukhra

Translation: He meant by “nutfatayn” (dual of nutfah) are the Roman sea and the Chinese sea because each “nutfah” is different from the others.

In much similar fashion to the previous example produced by Muslims, one is left in serious doubt as to how this entry in Lisan al-Arab is relevant at al in discussing Hamza’ s idea of “nutfah” being a “singular entity from  a bigger group of its kind”. Ironically, this entry is very much in line with the content of the paper, Embryology in the Qur'an: Much Ado about Nothing. In the paper, it was stated that Lisan al-Arab defined “nutfah” in the following manner;

Lisan al-Arab states that the Arabs called a small amount of water as well as a large amount of water “nutfah”. Thus, “nutfah” being used to refer to a sea reinforces the fact the term is generically used to denote any “amount of liquid”. Lisan also states that its more common usage is in order to denote “a small amount of liquid”. Thus, this second example produced by Muslim apologists supports the conclusions of Embryology in the Qur'an: Much Ado about Nothing.

Nevertheless, the underlying argument from the Muslims is the same as the one used in the previous examples regarding “pearls”. In this case, they claim because “nutfah” can mean “a single sea” it can therefore mean “a singular entity from a bigger group of its kind”.

This is unfortunately a repetition of all the bad arguments and misunderstanding discussed in this article so far. There is the initial conflation of Hamza’s idea of what “a singular entity from a bigger group of its kind” with the generalized argument from an irrelevant tautology discussed above.

This is also a repetition of the fallaciously false argument produced in regards to the example about “pearls”. “Nutfah” meaning “a single sea” does not entail that it cannot mean “a small amount of liquid”, “the fluid of man”, “semen due to its small amount” (all of which are the actual definition for “nutfah” in Lisan al-Arab). More importantly, “nutfah” signifying “a single sea” does not entail that it means “a singular entity from a bigger group of its kind” in the sense that Hamza has portrayed it.

Thus, after examining the two examples provided by the Muslim apologists, it is clear that the entries from Lisan al-Arab are irrelevant to the discussion and that the corresponding arguments are fallacious as well as false.

Most importantly, it is worth remembering that the very Lisan al-Arab that the apologists are trying to find needle-eyes in for the purpose of passing elephants through it, specifically and unambiguously defines “nutfah” as “the small amount of water”, “the fluid of the man” and “semen due to it’s small amount.”

---

[i]. Tzortzis, Hamza 2011. Embryology in the Quran: A Scientific-Linguistic Analysis of Chapter 23. Version 1.1. page 12  and page 55

[ii].Tzortzis, Hamza 2012. Embryology in the Quran: A Scientific-Linguistic Analysis of Chapter 23. Version 2.1. page 14 

[iii]. Captaindisguise & Taverille, M 2012.  Embryology in the Qur'an: Much Ado about Nothing. Page 16-20 and also can be accessed at the following address; http://embryologyinthequran.blogspot.com/2012/08/2-drop-of-fluid-nutfah.html

[iv]. Abdallah, Osama 2008. Detailed meanings of the Scientific Words in the Scientific Verses in the Holy Qur'an. http://www.answering-christianity.com/detailed_meanings_of_scientific_words_in_verses.htm  

[v]. Captaindisguise 2011. Osama Abdallah, Sperm & the Qur'an. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CK01KC6S1qs  

[vi]. Radden, G & Dirven, R  2007. Cognitive English Grammar. Volume 2 of Cognitive Linguistics in Practice. John Benjamins Publishing. Pages 63-78.

[vii]. “Mint”, n¹. The Oxford English Dictionary. 3rd edition, 2006; online version

Sept. 2012.

[viii].  Al-Khalidy, Nabeel 2012. Rebuttal of an atheist regarding a point in embryology and the Qur'an. http://understandingthequranmiracle.blogspot.com.au/2012/09/rebutle-of-atheist-regarding-point-in.html

Objection 2 to Embryology in the Quran: Much Ado about Nothing

For a longer list of objections and replies to Embryology in the Quran: Much Ado about Nothing, see the following page, http://embryologyinthequran.blogspot.com/p/objections-and-replies.html

2. Objection: Nabeel al-Khalidy (hereby LQA) who runs the popular youtube channel LearnQuranicArabic has made the following video response attacking the veracity of one of the claims made in the paper. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SllZ3IM0T2Y

LQA asserts that the grammar behind the Arabic term "نُطْفَة" (nutfah) indicates that the word does mean "a singular entity from a bigger group point" which was rejected as being baseless in the paper. He also asserts that sura 75:37 suggests that "نُطْفَة" (nutfah) indicates a substance other than sperm. (09/28/2012)

Reply: LQA’s video can be broken down to specific claims;

(1) The grammar behind the term "نُطْفَة" (nutfah) indicates the definition of “a singular entity from a bigger group of its kind”.

(2) Sura 75:37 indicates that "نُطْفَة" (nutfah) indicates a substance other than sperm.

Starting with (2), the claim made is that verse 75:37 which states “Was he not a “nutfah” of/from semen (maniyy) ejaculated?” indicates that "نُطْفَة" (nutfah) is a separate substance from “semen” since the word appears separately from the word for “semen”.

It is disappointing to watch Muslim critics merely repeat arguments already addressed and refuted in the paper. This exact claim was made by Hamza Tzortzis.[i] Therefore, this argument was discussed and was found to be baseless.[ii]

The basic summary of the findings in the paper was that the verse 75:37, when analyzed under the proper literary, linguistic and historical context provided by classical dictionaries such as Lisan al-Arab, reveals its meaning to be the following; “Was he not a small amount (“nutfah”) of/from semen (“maniyyin”) ejaculated?”[iii]

For an elaborate discussion of the above point, please refer to points 1 and 3 under section “Nutfah” in the paper, Embryology in the Qur'an: Much Ado about Nothing.[iv]

Now for LQA’s main contention (1). Once again, his contention can be found in the following video uploaded on his youtube channel.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SllZ3IM0T2Y

First and foremost, some background information needs to be cleared up.

1) LQA is not responding to the paper per se but the short introductory video that was uploaded to the youtube channel of Captaindisguise which only consists of a few points taken from the larger paper.[v]

2) Out of the few points mentioned in Captaindisguise’s video, LQA only attacks one partially, but pretends to have addressed the entire video when he does not. Thus, LQA’s response could be seen as attacking a strawman. Ironically, LQA agrees with the only point from Captaindisguise that he attacked by admitting that Lisan al-Arab does not say something that Hamza claimed it said.

3) LQA has deleted as well as refused to approve the comments left on his video. LQA has also decided to censor his comment section which reveals a lack of confidence in his work plus an intentional attempt to mislead his viewers by making it appear to them that no one objects to his rather poor video.

4) LQA has also refused to link his audience to Captaindisguise’s original video or paper and thus depriving them of understanding the actual claims made. Such actions by LQA can only be reasonably assigned to his intellectual cowardice.

Getting that out of the way, it is once again disappointing to see Muslim critics repeating arguments already addressed and refuted in the paper. A homologous argument was made by Hamza Tzortzis in his paper.[vi] The argument has thus been discussed and was subsequently found to be ludicrous.[vii]

Thus, LQA’s argument below has been addressed in the paper even before he made it. Nevertheless, his specific contention will be discussed below for the purpose of clarity and for the benefit of those who may be misled by LQA’s video due to their inability or reluctance to think critically.

LQA states the following (at timestamp 02:02);

“Just because a person knows Arabic, modern Arabic and has access to a dictionary does not mean he is an authority on the Qur'an”

This is a rather shallow representation of LQA’s opponents with the clear intention of using the tactic of “poisoning the well” or “moving the goalposts”  Certainly one does not need to be an authority of any field in order to check the accuracy of someone claiming a particular source states such and such. Captaindisguise and Martin Taverille have merely done this. For example, it was Hamza’s claim that the classical lexicon Lisan al-Arab defines or suggests the definition of “nutfah” as “a singular entity from a bigger group its kind.” Upon investigation, it was revealed that Lisan al-Arab does not contain such a definition and ironically, LQA admits to this being the case.

LQA then states the following (at timestamp 02:12),

“[Captaindisguise] is saying because of the fact that Lisan al-Arab does not mention that al-nutfah is “a singular entity”, it means that it is not a singular entity"

This is already a very dishonest representation of the points raised in Captaindisguise’s video and perhaps an attempt to keep his audience away from the facts that definitively weaken LQA’s argument. The non-existence of such a definition in Lisan al-Arab was not the only reason for why the conclusion that “nutfah” does not mean “a singular entity” was reached.

There were 4 points mentioned in Captaindisguise’s video and they are;

1) Lisan al-Arab does not define “nutfah” as “a singular entity from a bigger group of its kind” as was suggested by Hamza Tzortzis.

2) Lisan al-Arab specifically defines “nutfah” as “the little/small amount of water remaining in the bucket.” (LQA himself states "nutfah" is a "small amount of water").

3) Also, Lisan al-Arab specifically states that “semen (maniyyin) was called “nutfah” because of its small amount.”[viii] and thus "nutfah" was clearly used to refer to semen synonymously.

4) A hadith from the collection of Hadith Qudsi was mentioned due to it containing a narrative in which Muhammad, the founder of Islam, stating that human beings exist in the form of “nutfah” in the mother’s womb for a period of 40 days;[ix] such a view is erroneous whether “nutfah” means sperm or semen.

None of these points were even acknowledged by LQA and it certainly reveals his “nutfah” of cowardice.

Nevertheless, LQA then spells out his main objections (at timestamp 02:23)

“Now little does [Captaindisguise] know that actually the word "نُطْفَة" (nutfah) is on a specific pattern which is on the pattern of “فُعْلَة” (fua’la). So this pattern that  "نُطْفَة" (nutfah) is upon is actually associated with the individual parts produced by the associated verb.”

On a side note, Lisan al-Arab actually states that “there is no verb for nutfah”. However, for the purpose of argumentation, this statement from Lisan al-Arab is ignored and the following discussion will presume that there is a verb associated with "نُطْفَة" (nutfah). LQA continues (at timestamp 02:43);

“So let me just explain this. So we have the verb, for example, “قَطَعَ” (qataa’a) which means “he cut”, doesn’t matter what he cut but he cut something. If you take the 3 letter root, the “ق” (Qaf), the “ط” (Ta’a), the “ع” (Ayn) and you put it on the pattern of “فُعْلَة” (fua’la), you get “قُطْعَة” (quta’ah). So “قُطْعَة” (quta’ah) is actually a noun that denotes an individual part that is cut. So a person could cut something into a number of pieces. One of these pieces is called “قُطْعَة” (quta’ah). This pattern, “فُعْلَة” (fua’la), is also used for singular parts of the body. So for example, “جُذْمَة” (juzmah) means one part of the body. We have the noun “مُضْغَة” (mudghah). “مُضْغَة” (mudghah) means one lump of flesh or one chewed up lump of flesh and similarly we have "نُطْفَة" (nutfah) which is one part of seminal fluid.”

The above quote from LQA is his justification for his claim that “nutfah” can be defined as “a singular entity from a bigger group of its kind”. Specifically his claim is that “nutfah” means “a singular entity from a bigger group of its kind” because “nutfah” is in the pattern of “فُعْلَة” (fua’la).

The amazing irony of this claim is that while it seems to rely on the specifics of Arabic grammar, one does not need any knowledge of the Arabic language in order to understand the logical fallaciousness of LQA’s argument.

This is because LQA’s premise boils down to the following statement;

“There is a pattern (“فُعْلَة” (fua’la)) in Arabic and any word written in that pattern refers to a singular entity from a bigger group of its kind.”

LQA cannot make his argument valid without accepting the above premise. Quite clearly, the above premise is false which can be easily determined from the examples provide by LQA in his video alone. The examples given by LQA are;

1) “قُطْعَة” (quta’ah) is a piece of wood.

2) “جُذْمَة” (juzmah) is a part of the body.

3) “مُضْغَة” (mudghah) is a lump of flesh.

LQA’s reasoning can be applied to a vast many words in Arabic i.e. if “nutfah” is allowed to be defined as “a singular entity from a bigger group of its kind” merely due to it having a specific morphological pattern (“فُعْلَة” (fua’la)) then it follows inescapably that any word having that specific morphological pattern (“فُعْلَة” (fua’la)) can also mean “a singular entity from a bigger group of its kind.” Any attempts to exclude other words would be special pleading which, without strong reasons, is one of the worst ad hoc fallacies in argumentation.

Thus, LQA’s logic would lead one to conclude that “قُطْعَة” (quta’ah), “جُذْمَة” (juzmah), “مُضْغَة” (mudghah) and any other word of that form can be defined as “a singular entity from a bigger group of its kind.” Interestingly, “مُضْغَة” (mudghah) is a word used in the Qur'an to describe the embryo as a lump of flesh. Would LQA argue that due to the word “مُضْغَة” (mudghah), the embryo is part of a bigger group of embryos?

LQA's notion is also falsified by the words of Muhammad himself. Muhammad can be seen referring to the heart as well as the penis using the word “مُضْغَة” (mudghah) (in http://sunnah.com/urn/342030 & http://sunnah.com/urn/1101660  & http://sunnah.com/abudawud/1/181). This further debilitates the notion that any word that follows the pattern of “فُعْلَة” (fua’la) has to mean "a singular entity from a bigger group of it's kind". A much more consistent explanation for “فُعْلَة” (fua’la) is that it refers to a "small amount of a substance". Thus, it would be coherent for “مُضْغَة” (mudghah) to mean "a small amount of flesh" while referring to the heart or the penis. Likewise, it would be more coherent and consistent with the all the usages of "نُطْفَة" (nutfah) in Lisan al-Arab if it meant "a small amount of liquid" such as semen.

Worsening the tragedy, if one were to mix LQA’s reasoning with Hamza’s logic, one would be arguing that “قُطْعَة” (quta’ah), “جُذْمَة” (juzmah), “مُضْغَة” (mudghah) and any other word of that form are referring to sperm cells as Hamza had concluded that "نُطْفَة" (nutfah) refers to sperm because it was defined as "a singular entity from a bigger group of it's kind." Such an absurd mess is what LQA’s argument inevitably leads to.

Perhaps, the chaos LQA brings is a product of his ignorance of the English language. Perhaps, he does not understand that “a piece of wood” is different from saying “a singular entity of wood”. Likewise, “a small amount of water/liquid” is not equivalent to “a singular entity of water/liquid”. Colloquially speaking, it does not even make much sense to say something like “a singular entity of wood” or “a singular entity of water.” If any meaning can be given to the phrase, “a singular entity of water”, it would have to refer to a single water molecule (which is smaller than the nanoscale). Quite clearly, the phrase “a small amount of water” which would have to refer to a macroscopic amount of water cannot refer to a single molecule of water or a singular entity of water. The same can said of “a piece of wood” or “a part of the body” or “a lump of flesh”. Words such as “amount”, “piece”, “part” etc are not referring to a discrete amount of something. Thus, LQA is flawed in his equivocation of the two very distant concepts. LQA’s flawed thinking is similar to a person claiming that “a small heap of sand” is equal to “a single grain of sand”.

On the other hand, the grand irony of LQA’s video is that it ultimately supports the claims made by Captaindisguise. For example, he defined “nutfah” as “a part of the seminal fluid”. However, this is no different from saying “a small amount of semen” which is the definition or understanding provided by Captaindisguise in his paper, Embryology in the Qur'an: Much Ado about Nothing.[x] More importantly, his definition does not lend any support for any of Hamza’s claims neither does LQA even attempt to demonstrate how his arguments either refute Captaindisguise’s point or support Hamza’s points.

Having made an absolute mess of the Arabic language using his self-employed authority and having failed to refute any of Captaindisguise’s point, LQA continues to state the following ridiculously erroneous or incoherent statements; (at timestamp 04:06)

“This is why the Lisan al-Arab, actually one of the meanings found in Lisan al-arab is “الماء القليل”, a small amount of water. Because we know that seminal fluid is made up of a large number of sperm cells. These sperm cells actually are surrounded by water and this is what actually the sperm cells use to travel to the egg. Without this water, they will not be able to travel. So it amazing that Allah (SWT) actually chose the word nutfah which has the meaning of fluid which is like water that is used by the sperm cell.”

First and foremost, seminal fluid is not made up of “sperm cells” Semen is distinct from sperm. If anything, it is this fact that differentiates modern ideas about reproduction from the ancient ideas. Semen is considered to be a vehicle for the sperm cells.[xi] For example, defects in the testicles could prevent the production of “sperm” yet this would not impact the production of semen which is a separate liquid that exists with or without sperm cells. Thus, LQA is in error when he makes the statement, “seminal fluid is made up of a large number of sperm cells.”

Secondly, LQA’s words are inconsistent with his endeavor. LQA states “nutfah” refers to “the fluid” that is surrounding the sperm cells which in reality is SEMEN. With such a statement, LQA’s video seems like an exercise in vain. If at the end of all the miserable argumentation, if he ultimately concludes that “nutfah” refers to the semen or the fluind surrounding and used by the sperm cells, then everything he has said is in perfect harmony with the points made by CaptainDisguise in his paper. Not to mention the implications of error as it wrong to claim humans are created from semen or the fluid surround the sperm cells when in fact humans are created from the sperm itself.

Overall, a deeper look at LQA’s claims reveal that 1) he is merely repeating arguments already addressed and refuted in the paper; 2) his argument is fallacious, non-specific and inevitably leads to a mess of absurdities; and 3) the bigger picture of LQA’s claims reveals that his points are ironically consistent with all the points made by Captaindisguise and Martin Taverille in their paper, Embryology in the Qur'an: Much Ado about Nothing and more importantly, his arguments do not provide any support for Hamza’s refuted claims and hopes.

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[i]. Tzortzis, Hamza 2012. Embryology in the Quran: A Scientific-Linguistic Analysis of Chapter 23. Version 2.1. page 15 

[ii]. Captaindisguise & Taverille, M 2012.  Embryology in the Qur'an: Much Ado about Nothing. Page 35.

[iii]. “نطفة (Nutfah)”. Lisan-al-Arab. http://www.baheth.info  

[iv].  Captaindisguise & Taverille, M 2012.  Embryology in the Qur'an: Much Ado about Nothing. Page 16 and 35 and also can be accessed at the following address; http://embryologyinthequran.blogspot.com/2012/08/2-drop-of-fluid-nutfah.html

[v]. Captaindisguise 2012. Embryology in the Qur'an: Much Ado about Nothing – Hamza Tzortzis refuted.  http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mPgT_gV97tw 

[vi]. Tzortzis, Hamza 2012. Embryology in the Quran: A Scientific-Linguistic Analysis of Chapter 23. Version 2.1. page 16

[vii]. Captaindisguise & Taverille, M 2012.  Embryology in the Qur'an: Much Ado about Nothing. Page 16 and 35 and also can be accessed at the following address; http://embryologyinthequran.blogspot.com/2012/08/2-drop-of-fluid-nutfah.html

[viii]. Ibid., page 16 - 20

[ix]. Hadith Qudsi (or Sacred Hadith). Hadith 4. http://sunnah.com/nawawi40/4

[x]. Captaindisguise & Taverille, M 2012.  Embryology in the Qur'an: Much Ado about Nothing. Page 35

[xi]. Stoppard, Miriam 2008. Conception, Pregnancy & Birth: The Childbirth Bible for Today's Parents. Penguin publications. Page 30.